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COMMENTS
RECONCILING SHAREHOLDER LIMITED LIABILITY
WITH VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT LIABILITY: HOLDING
PARENT CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR THE
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF SUBSIDIARIES *
INTRODUCTION
A deeply rooted principle of corporate law is that shareholders
of a corporation are insulated from liability for the acts of the cor-
poration.' However, there are exceptions to this rule. Under the
corporate law doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil," plaintiffs
can seek to hold shareholders liable for the debts and acts of a
corporation when the corporate form is misused as a mere in-
strumentality or alter ego of its owner.2 Furthermore, corporate
law principles recognize the direct liability of shareholders when
they actually commit the transgressions on behalf of the corpora-
tion.3 Both of these doctrines require a thorough analysis of the
relationship between the shareholders and corporation, as well as
the relationship between the shareholders and the acts that cre-
ate liability.
* This comment was the first-place winner of the 2006 McNeill Writing Competition
sponsored by the McNeill Law Society of the University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995); Geyer v. Inter-
soll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992).
3. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1998) (stating direct liability
under corporate law recognizes that those who commit the infringement will not be insu-
lated from liability merely because they committed the wrongdoing through a corporation
or subsidiary); see also infra Part II.B. Copyright law also holds one who commits the in-
fringement directly liable. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000) ("Anyone who violates the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the au-
thor.").
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Yet, in the copyright context, shareholders are not as well
shielded from liability. While courts generally recognize that
shareholders may be vicariously liable for the copyright infring-
ing acts of a corporation,4 the test for determining shareholder li-
ability is imprecise and unsettled. Under traditional vicarious
copyright liability, a parent corporation may be held liable when
it has the right and ability to supervise its subsidiary, and has a
financial interest in the infringement.5 Some courts hold that a
parent corporation will always meet this standard by virtue of its
"legal control" of the subsidiary, and thus will always be liable for
the copyright infringement of its subsidiary.6 However, other
courts look to evidence that the parent exercised "actual control"
over its subsidiary and require a "substantial and continuing
connection" between the parent and subsidiary with respect to
the infringing acts.7 This test is better suited to assessing the li-
ability of a parent corporation in such situations, but it errone-
ously considers certain elements of the corporate relationship,
such as the percentage of stock ownership by the parent, which
creates incorrect presumptions as to parental "control" over the
subsidiary.
Neither theory of vicarious liability works adequately when
applied to a parent-subsidiary relationship. Instead, copyright
law should incorporate elements of corporate law when determin-
ing whether a parent corporation is liable for its subsidiary's in-
fringement. Rather than applying traditional vicarious liability
theories in these instances, courts should employ a standard
based on the extent of parental participation in the infringement,
the purpose of the infringing activity, and whether the parent ex-
plicitly or implicitly endorsed the activity that resulted in the in-
fringement.
4. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284-85
(E.D.N.Y. 2002).
5. See infra Part II.B.2. Another type of secondary liability, contributory infringe-
ment, generally holds that one who, with knowledge of copyright infringing activity, in-
duces, causes or materially contributes to infringing conduct of another may be held liable
as a "contributory" infringer. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). However, that form of liability is beyond the scope of this
paper.
6. See infra Part II.B.2.
7. See id.
[Vol. 41:535
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Part I of this article discusses the liability of parent corpora-
tions for the acts of their subsidiaries under different theories of
corporate law. Part II discusses the policy behind copyright law,
the theory of vicarious liability under copyright law, and the pol-
icy behind that doctrine. Part III compares and contrasts the
various ways courts have applied vicarious copyright liability or
corporate law to either hold liable or absolve shareholders, inves-
tors, and parent corporations. Finally, Part IV argues the rules of
vicarious liability under copyright law should consider corporate
law doctrines when a plaintiff seeks to hold a parent liable for the
acts of a subsidiary, and proposes a different standard for such a
purpose.
I. CORPORATE LAW & POLICY
A. Limited Liability
An overriding doctrine of corporate law is that shareholders are
traditionally shielded from the liability of a corporation whose
shares they own.' As a corollary, "[i]t is a general principle deeply
'ingrained in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corpo-
ration ... is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries."9 Thus, "it is
hornbook law that 'the exercise of the "control" which stock own-
ership gives to stockholders . . . will not create liability beyond
the assets of the subsidiary.""0
Section 6.22 of the Model Business Corporation Act codifies the
limited liability of shareholders by specifying that a shareholder's
obligation to the corporation is solely "to pay the consideration for
which the shares were authorized to be issued."11 Moreover, the
8. See, e.g., Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1227
(9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to pierce the corporate veil of defendant corporation).
9. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting William 0. Douglas &
Carol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.
J. 193, 193 (1929)) (holding that parent corporation liability for pollution does not stem
from its position as a shareholder of the polluting company, but from the parent's direct
operation of the polluting plant); see also Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)
("Limited liability is the rule, not the exception.").
10. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-62 (quoting Douglas & Shanks, supra note 9, at 196).
11. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(a) (2005). The Model Business Corporation Act ("the
Act") is designed as a general corporation statute to be enacted in whole or in part by state
legislatures. Id. at Introduction. It was approved by the Committee on Corporate Laws of
the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association ("ABA") and many states'
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Act mandates that "a shareholder of a corporation is not person-
ally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation." 2 In addition,
the vast majority of state incorporation statutes expressly insu-
late shareholders from liability for the debts or acts of a corpora-
tion. 13 Some commentators have suggested this grant of limited
liability is "'the greatest advantage of incorporation' and "'per-
haps the distinguishing feature'" of corporate law. 4
The purpose of granting limited liability to shareholders is to
encourage investment in private entities.'5 Two separate princi-
ples promote private investment. First, limited liability reduces
risk aversion among shareholders. Without limited liability, an
investor might avoid valuable investments because he is averse to
the risk of losing his assets, no matter how small the risk. 16 Even
if an investor accepts the risk, the high monitoring costs unlim-
ited liability requires might force him to forego the investment.
By limiting the shareholder's risks, limited liability increases the
availability of funds for financially riskier, but more valuable,
corporate endeavors which, "[bly hypothesis . . . are socially de-
sirable projects." 7 Second, limited liability encourages efficient
investment strategies by separating "capital" from "skill."' 8 It al-
lows individuals with capital, but no business management skills,
"to invest in the enterprises of others." 9
current corporate laws are based on its provisions. Id.
12. Id. § 6.22(b).
13. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-622B (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-622(b) (2001);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-106-203(2) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-673(b) (West 2005);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-622(b) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-83(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 30-1-622 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-3(b) (LexisNexis 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 490.622(2) (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.6-220(2) (LexisNexis 2003); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1317(4) (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-6.22(b) (West 1999);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-534(2) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2041(2) (1997); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:6.22(b) (LexisNexis 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-9(b) (2005); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.151(2) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(b) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-
203(b) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-622(2) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 6.22(b)
(1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-622(b) (2005).
14. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1208-09 (2002) (quoting I. MAURICE WORMSER,
DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 14 (1927)).
15. See id. at 1210.
16. See id. at 1218.
17. Id. at 1218-19.
18. Id. at 1217.
19. Id.
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Previously, some commentators suggested the fact that a cor-
poration has a legal status "independent" of its shareholders jus-
tifies limited liability. 2° They reasoned that corporate activities
are distinct from shareholder activities, and a change in share-
holder ownership should not affect the corporate entity.21 How-
ever, this justification has been "largely abandoned. '' 22 The cur-
rent view is that limited shareholder liability is "an attribute of
the investment rather than of 'the corporation."'23
B. Exceptions to Limited Liability
However, there are exceptions to limited liability; shareholders
may, in particular circumstances, be held liable for the acts of the
corporation. First, the "alter ego" theory permits a court to "pierce
the corporate veil" by reaching beyond the assets of a corporation
in order to access its shareholder's assets. This doctrine allows
piercing, and thus, indirect shareholder liability, "when, inter
alia, the corporate form would otherwise be misused to accom-
plish certain wrongful purposes ... on the shareholder's behalf."24
In order to pierce the corporate veil in the parent-subsidiary
context under the alter ego theory, generally a plaintiff must
show: (1) there is such unity of interest and ownership that the
subsidiary is a "mere instrumentality" of the parent; and (2) an
overall element of injustice is present.25 When evaluating
whether a corporation is a "mere instrumentality" of its share-
holder/parent, courts must determine whether the shareholder
has abused the corporate form by exercising "undue domination
or control."26 Although the law varies between jurisdictions, un-
der this analysis courts generally find relevant: (1) whether the
corporation was insolvent; (2) whether dividends were paid; (3)
whether there was a co-mingling of funds between the corpora-
20. Id. at 1212.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1213.
23. Id. (quoting FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 11 (1991)).
24. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998).
25. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1134-35
(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (per cu-
riam) (reversing and remanding district court's determination that piercing the corporate
veil was appropriate)).
26. See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1459 (2d Cir. 1995).
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tion and the shareholder; (4) whether the shareholders repre-
sented themselves as being personally liable for the corporation;
(5) whether the corporation functioned as a facade for the par-
ent/shareholder; (6) whether corporate formalities were observed;
and (7) whether the dominant shareholder siphoned funds away
from the corporation. 
2 7
Under a second corporate law doctrine, a parent may be found
directly liable for the acts of its subsidiary. The Supreme Court of
the United States held in United States v. Bestfoods, 28 where
"'the parent is directly a participant in the wrong complained of,"
and not simply a source of personnel and management who per-
petuate the wrong, "the parent is directly liable for its own ac-
tions."29 This form of liability, unlike piercing the corporate veil,
focuses not on the corporate form, but on the parent's actual in-
volvement in the acts that created liability. In Bestfoods, the Su-
preme Court stated that "' [c]ontrol of the subsidiary, if extensive
enough, gives rise to indirect liability under piercing doctrine, not
direct liability."'' 0 Thus, in regards to direct liability, the exis-
tence of the parent-subsidiary relationship alone is irrelevant.31
The inquiry is instead whether a parent "actually operated the
business of its subsidiary."32 It is immaterial if the acts com-
27. See Taylor Steel, Inc. v. Keeton, 417 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2005); Patin v. Thor-
oughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 648-49 (5th Cir. 2002); Fletcher, 68 F.3d at
1458; Bolivar v. Pocklington, 975 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); NLRB v. O'Neill, 965 F.2d
1522, 1529-30 (9th Cir. 1992); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1466,
1476 (3d Cir. 1988); LeRoux's Billyle Supper Club v. Ma, 602 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that in deciding whether the company is an alter ego of the individual,
Ohio courts consider such factors as: "(1) grossly inadequate capitalization, (2) failure to
observe corporate formalities, (3) insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time the debt
is incurred, (4) shareholders holding themselves out as personally liable for certain corpo-
rate obligations, (5) diversion of funds or other property of the company property for per-
sonal use, (6) absence of corporate records, and (7) the fact that the corporation was a
mere facade for the operations of the dominant shareholder(s)").
28. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
29. Id. at 64-65 (quoting Douglas & Shanks, supra note 9, at 208); see also HARRY G.
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
347 (3d ed. 1983) ("Apart from corporation law principles, a shareholder, whether a natu-
ral person or a corporation, may be liable on the ground that such shareholder's activity
resulted in the liability.").
30. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 68 (quoting Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and
Operator Analysis Under CERCLA: Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 269 (1994)).
31. See Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding a parent is liable if it actually exercised control over or was otherwise inti-
mately involved in the operations of the subsidiary corporation).
32. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating
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plained of occurred superficially through the subsidiary, so long
as the parent can be said to have committed them.33
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. Copyright Law and Policy
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
Congress shall have the power "To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."34 The federal power to enact copyright legisla-
tion is derived from this clause.35 The Copyright Act affords copy-
right protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."36
The predominant philosophical framework underlying the
Copyright Act is utilitarian.37 The purpose of copyright protection
is not purely to reward the author, but rather to balance copy-
right protection, "which seeks to ensure a fair return to authors"
and establish incentives for creation, with dissemination of the
work, which promotes progress and advancement.3" Copyright
law motivates the creative activity of authors and inventors by
granting economic incentives, in the form of a limited monopoly,
which permits authors to maintain exclusive control over their
that operator liability "requires active involvement in the affairs of the subsidiary").
33. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 72-73 (holding parent corporation liable for CERCLA
violations that occurred at the facility of its subsidiary). "The question is not whether the
parent operates the subsidiary, but rather whether it operates the facility, and that opera-
tion is evidenced by participation in the activities of the facility, not the subsidiary.'" Id. at
68 (quoting Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis Under
CERCLA: Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 269
(1994)).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress can make "[aill Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.").
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
37. While this rationale is predominate in the United States, an alternative "natural
law" justification is prevalent in Europe. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.7, at 18 (3d ed. 1999).
38. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993).
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work."9 This limited monopoly "reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged
and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability to literature, music,
and the other arts."4 ° Dissemination is achieved by allowing the
public to access the creation or invention after the limited period
of exclusive control has expired.41 The rationale is that the public
benefits from the creative activities of authors, and a copyright
monopoly is a necessary condition to the full realization of such
activities.
B. The Doctrine of Vicarious Copyright Liability
1. Statutory Support
While the Copyright Act provides liability for acts of copyright
infringement, it does not contain any provision explicitly provid-
ing for one party's liability based on infringing acts committed by
another party.42 However, while not expressly stated, the Act
does provide some support for indirect liability. Among the rights
granted to a copyright owner is the "exclusive right.., to author-
ize" others to exercise the various rights under the copyright.43
One can conclude that Congress's use of the term "exclusive right
• .. to authorize" creates liability for one who, without the au-
thor's permission, authorizes another to engage in acts exclu-
sively granted to the author.4' Furthermore, the Act defines an
infringer as "[alnyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
39. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Tex-
aco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[Clopyright
law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploita-
tion of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of
knowledge.... The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.").
40. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the [Copyright
Clause] . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors. ..
41. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
42. Id. at 434 ("The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for in-
fringement committed by another."); see also Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289,
291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Federal copyright law, unlike patent law, does not expressly cre-
ate any form of derivative, third-party liability.").
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
44. Id. (emphasis added); see also Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d
59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986); Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Cont'l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1443
(9th Cir. 1986).
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the copyright owner."4 The term "anyone" can be read to include
those who control, contribute to, or benefit from the infringe-
ment.46 A House Report in the legislative history of the Copyright
Act also indicates that the Act intended to codify case law which
allows vicarious copyright liability.47 The House Report notes
that in order to be a vicarious infringer, "a defendant must either
actively operate or supervise the [infringing activities], or control
the content of the infringing [material], and expect commercial
gain from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit from
the infringe [ment]." s
Congress also endorsed secondary liability by enacting two
statutes that shield some entities from such liability. First, under
certain conditions, section 111(a) of the Copyright Act exempts
passive carriers from liability arising out of secondary television
transmissions of copyrighted material.49 Second, the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") ° includes a safe harbor provi-
sion for online service providers that shields them from monetary
liability for infringing material posted or transmitted by their
subscribers.51 As the Supreme Court stated:
The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does
not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on
certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity. For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the
law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species
of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is
just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another. 52
As a result, a long series of cases under the Act impose liability
for acts of infringement committed by others.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5775-76.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 160 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5776.
48. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5775-76.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2000).
50. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1) (2000); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2) (2000) ("Nothing in
this section shall enlarge or diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright in-
fringement").
52. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
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2. The Shapiro Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., Inc. 3 was the first to
establish the modern test for vicarious copyright liability. In
Shapiro, Jalen Amusement Company directly infringed copy-
rights on sound recordings by manufacturing "bootleg" records.54
Jalen operated its business as concessionaire in various stores of
H.L. Green Co. ("Green"). 5 The copyright owners sued Green,
claiming it contributed to and actively participated in the sale of
the "bootleg" records.56 Several licensing agreements between
Jalen and Green provided that Jalen and its employees were to
"'abide by, observe and obey all rules and regulations promul-
gated from time to time by H.L. Green Company, Inc."' 57 In addi-
tion, Green had the authority to discharge any of Jalen's employ-
ees believed to be conducting themselves improperly."s The
licenses also provided that Green was to receive a percentage of
Jalen's gross receipts from the sale of records.59 The trial court
found, based on these facts, that Green did not actively partici-
pate in the sale of the records and had no knowledge of the unau-
thorized manufacture of the records.°
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed. The court evaluated two lines of cases involving vicarious
infringers who exhibited varying degrees of involvement in the
direct infringement.61 The first line of cases involved landlord-
tenant relationships, which held that a landlord was not respon-
sible for the infringing acts of a tenant if the landlord had no no-
tice of the infringement.62 In contrast, the second line of cases,
involving dance halls, held dance-hall proprietors liable for in-
53. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
54. Id. at 305-06.
55. Id. at 306.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 307-08; see also Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Read-
ing Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1011 (2000) (arguing that courts should use an "ac-
tual" control standard when evaluating vicarious liability of internet service providers).
62. See Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938); cf. Fromont v. Aeolian Co.,
254 F. 592, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (holding that the landlord was not responsible for in-
fringement when he had no notice of the infringement when he entered into the contract
with the defendant).
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fringing performances by bands and orchestras, regardless of
whether the proprietor had knowledge of the works to be per-
formed or the ability to control their selection.63 Because Shapiro
involved a relationship with a high degree of actual control and
direct benefit, the court viewed the facts in that case as similar to
the "dance hall" cases rather than the "landlord-tenant" cases and
held Green liable for Jalen's infringement.64 The court found
"[w]hen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvi-
ous and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted
materials . . . the purposes of copyright law may be best effectu-
ated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that ex-
ploitation."65 Thus, the Second Circuit developed a two-prong test
for determining vicarious liability; a plaintiff must prove the de-
fendant had a right and ability to supervise the infringing activ-
ity and had an obvious and direct financial interest in it. 66 This is
widely accepted as the modern test for vicarious copyright liabil-
ity and is applied by the vast majority of courts.67
The first prong of the Shaprio test focuses on a party's power to
police the primary infringer. As the court in Shapiro stated:
[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police care-
fully the conduct of its concessionaire Jalen; our judgment will sim-
ply encourage it to do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and
should be effectively exercised. Green's burden will not be unlike
that quite commonly imposed on publishers, printers, and vendors of
copyrighted material. 68
63. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland
Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929); M. Witmark
& Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Mass. 1960).
64. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1963).
65. Id. at 307.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2003); Nel-
son-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2002); A&M Re-
cords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001); Matthew Bender & Co.
v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 707 n.22 (2d Cir. 1998); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996); Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession
Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home,
Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court has arguably endorsed this
test as well. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435
(1984) ("The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not
themselves engaged in the infringing activity.").
68. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
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However, subsequent court decisions interpret the "power to po-
lice" in different ways. Some courts hold that mere legal authority
to control, not an actual exercise of control, is sufficient to show
liability.69 These courts assign liability so long as the party has
the potential ability to prevent infringement, even if the "ability"
is founded only in a legal or contractual right.7" Under this view,
it is relatively easy to satisfy the control requirement.71
For example, in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc.,72 the plaintiffs sued Columbia Artists Man-
agement, Inc. ("CAMI"), claiming it was vicariously liable for its
role in promoting concerts. 73 At these concerts, which were spon-
sored by local concert associations, performers infringed copy-
rights in musical compositions. 74 The court noted that while
CAMI had no actual power to control the local associations or the
artists, because the local associations depended on CAMI for di-
rection in such matters, "CAMI was in a position to police the in-
fringing conduct of its artists."75 Thus, the court relied on CAMI's
"pervasive participation" in the associations to conclude that
CAMI had the requisite ability to control, despite its lack of for-
mal power to supervise the infringers.76
In contrast, other courts employ a higher standard and require
evidence of an actual exercise of control. 77 These courts also as-
sess the defendant's ability to prevent the infringement.78 How-
ever, unlike the legal control standard, this standard rejects con-
trol predicated upon a legal relationship. 79 "Actual control
requires more than the potential right to cease all activities un-
differentiated from the infringement, the right to terminate other
69. See, e.g., Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63; Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. NevadaTIG, Inc.,
855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328-29 (D. Mass. 1994).
71. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment, New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service Pro-
vider Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in Search of a Problem? 38 IDEA
335, 348 (1998).
72. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
73. Id. at 1160.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1163.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Artists Music Inc. v. Reed Publ'g Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
78. See, e.g., Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1109-10; Artists Music, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1627.
79. See Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1107-08.
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activities, or the effective ability to terminate only after infringe-
ment is evident.
8 0
The Southern District of New York applied the actual control
standard in Demetriades v. Kaufmann."l In that case, the court
evaluated the vicarious liability of a real estate broker who was
involved in negotiations between a developer and landowner; the
developer and landowner infringed a copyright in architectural
plans.8 2 In its analysis, the court required "meaningful evidence
. . . of control over the direct infringers." 3 Although the broker
was aware of the infringement and in a position to prevent it, the
court held that potential ability to control the infringement was
insufficient to impose liability. 4
The second prong of the Shaprio test is also subject to varying
interpretations. Some courts require evidence of direct financial
benefit.8 5 In Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communi-
cations, Inc., 6 the Second Circuit held that Hodge, the president
and shareholder of an infringing corporation, was not vicariously
liable because the mere fact he owned shares of the corporation
was "too attenuated to establish a sufficiently 'direct' financial in-
terest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials."" Conversely,
other courts hold that a defendant can, as a matter of law, have a
direct financial interest as a result of the legal relationship be-
tween it and the direct infringer."8
80. Wright, supra note 61, at 1013. Also note that the legislative history of the Copy-
right Act states, "a defendant must either actively operate or supervise the [infringing ac-
tivities], or control the content of the infringing [material], and expect commercial gain
from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit from the infringe [ment]." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5775-76 (empha-
sis added).
81. 690 F. Supp. 289, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Colum-
bia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
82. See id. at 290-91.
83. Id. at 292-93.
84. See id. at 293-94.
85. See Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Commc'ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 971-72
(2d Cir. 1997). The court also compared this standard to the court's holding in Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963). See Softel, 118 F.3d at
971.
86. 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997).
87. Id. at 971-72 (citing Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307-08).
88. See, e.g., RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 782 (2d
Cir. 1988) (holding that a fifty percent shareholder has a direct financial interest in the
corporation's exploitation of the copyrighted materials as a matter of law); see also All Na-
tions Music v. Christian Family Network, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 863, 868-89 (W.D. Mich.
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The court in Shapiro deliberately excluded actual knowledge as
a requirement for vicarious copyright infringement.89 The court
noted that a dance-hall proprietor "is liable whether the band-
leader is considered, as a technical matter, an employee or an in-
dependent contractor, and whether or not the proprietor has
knowledge of the compositions to be played or any control over
their selection."9" Since Shapiro, courts have consistently held
that lack of knowledge is no defense.91
C. Vicarious Copyright Liability Policy
The doctrine of vicarious liability "developed from the law of
agency, specifically employer-employee relationships, in which
the 'master' was held strictly liable for the torts of a 'servant."'92
In this respect, "[vlicarious copyright liability is an 'outgrowth' of
respondeat superior," imposing liability on those with a suffi-
ciently supervisory relationship to the direct infringer. 93 How-
ever, in the copyright context, vicarious liability exceeds the tra-
1997) (finding that the shareholder and president of a corporation had, as a matter of law,
a direct financial interest in the copyright infringements) (citing Cass County Music Co. v.
C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1996)).
89. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 (citing DeAcosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945)).
90. Id.
91. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d
801, 811 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that the defendant's actual knowledge of copyright in-
fringement is not necessary for a finding of liability); Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Scorpio
Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding importer of phonore-
cords liable for copyright infringement as a matter of law without consideration of defen-
dant's actual knowledge of infringement); Italian Book Corp. v. Palms Sheepshead Coun-
try Club, Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. 326, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding landowner liable for
copyright infringement of songs at an event held on defendants' property despite defen-
dant lack of intent to infringe); Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handlings Sys., Inc., 379 F. Supp.
1190, 1196 (D. Del. 1974) (holding a defendant that furnishes materials to a printer is li-
able if the printer chooses to reproduce infringing matter from materials even if defendant
had instructed the printer not to do so); Chappel & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798, 801
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding corporate officer liable as related defendant although he was un-
aware that the activities he directed were unlicensed and therefore infringing); Morser v.
Bengor Prods. Co., 283 F. Supp. 926, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding corporate officer liable
as related defendant in connection with infringing sales although such sales were made
contrary to his orders); Bourne v. Fouche, 238 F. Supp. 745, 746 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (holding
night club owners liable for performance of infringing songs, even though they had no
knowledge or intent to infringe).
92. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325 (D. Mass.
1994).
93. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)); see Demetriades v.
Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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ditional scope of the master-servant theory. As noted above, the
proprietor of a dance hall is liable for infringing performances of
the orchestra, even if the orchestra is hired as an independent
contractor and exclusively selects the music to be played.94 This
broad net of liability is founded primarily on a policy of risk allo-
cation:
When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in which iden-
tifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily fair and
reasonable to place responsibility for those losses on the person who
profits, even if that person makes arrangements for others to per-
form the acts that foreseeably cause the losses. The law of vicarious
liability treats the expected losses as simply another cost of doing
business. The enterprise and the person profiting from it are better
able than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose
act caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to others
who have profited from the enterprise. In addition, placing responsi-
bility for the loss on the enterprise has the added benefit of creating
a ereater incentive for the enterprise to police its operations carefully
to avoid unnecessary losses.
95
As one commentator observed, "It is the innocent infringer who
must suffer, since he, unlike the copyright owner, either has an
opportunity to guard against the infringement (by diligent in-
quiry), or at least the ability to guard against the infringement
(by an indemnity agreement . . . and/or by insurance)."96 Simi-
larly, as the court noted in Shapiro, "Green ha[d] the power to po-
lice carefully the conduct of its concessionaire . . . our judgment
will simply encourage it to do so, thus placing responsibility
where it can and should be effectively exercised."97
III. APPLICATIONS OF VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT LIABILITY TO
SHAREHOLDERS, INVESTORS, AND PARENT-SUBSIDIARY ENTITIES
A. Individual Shareholders and Investors
Generally, copyright lawsuits against individual shareholders
seek to hold them jointly and severally liable for the infringing
94. See Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th
Cir. 1929); Bourne, 238 F. Supp. at 745; M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Soc. & Athletic
Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Mass. 1960).
95. Polygram Int'l, 855 F. Supp. at 1325.
96. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (ci-
tations omitted).
97. Id.
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acts of the corporation. 98 The resulting court decisions indicate
that shareholder status alone is insufficient to impose vicarious
liability. In United States v. Washington Mint, L.L.C.,99 the
United States government sued a private mint for copyright in-
fringement arising from its production of a gold coin replica.' 0
After finding the mint directly liable, the court found the mint's
sole shareholder, Suvon, and one of Suvon's principals, Henry
Cousineau, not vicariously liable.'0 ' The court stated that
"[allthough Suvon is the controlling shareholder in the Washing-
ton Mint's stock, status as an investor, without more, is insuffi-
cient ... to impose liability for [copyright infringement]."1"2 Simi-
larly, the court held "[a]lthough [Cousineaul has significant
ownership interests in [Suvon], these interests are not alone suf-
ficient to impose liability upon him for any of the violations al-
leged."' '3 The court found that "although the government has
shown that Cousineau is on the Washington Mint's board of di-
rectors, it has not demonstrated that he had any direct participa-
tion in or control over its activities."'0 4 In Softel, Inc. v. Dragon
Medical & Scientific Communications, Inc., °5 the court deter-
mined that Dragon's President, Hodge, was not vicariously liable
for Dragon's copyright infringement. 106 The court stated that
"[t]he only evidence that Softel adduced ... relating to the issue
of Hodge's supervisory capacities and financial interests was that
Hodge was the president of Dragon and a shareholder."0 7 Thus,
at least in the individual shareholder context, courts do not find
shareholder status determinative of supervisory ability.'
98. See, e.g., Jobete Music Co., Inc. v. Media Broad. Corp., 713 F. Supp. 174, 178
(M.D.N.C. 1988) (holding the sole shareholder jointly and severally liable); Broad. Music
Inc. v. Behulak, 651 F. Supp. 57, 59 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (seeking to hold individual partial
shareholder jointly and severally liable); Blendingwell Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 612
F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Del. 1985) (finding the sole shareholder liable for infringement);
Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (D.R.I. 1982) (holding the individ-
ual and corporate defendant jointly and severally liable).
99. 115 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (D. Minn. 2000).
100. See id. at 1091-92.
101. See id. at 1106.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court also held that Suvon's status as a shareholder would not cause him
to be liable for trademark infringement. Id.
104. Id.
105. 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997).
106. Id. at 971-72.
107. Id. at 971.
108. See also United States v. Washington Mint, L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1106 (D.
[Vol. 41:535
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Those cases that have found shareholders vicariously liable for
the infringing acts of a corporation usually involved a shareholder
who was also an officer or director of the corporation. 0 9 While
courts have not directly addressed the issue, cases tend to sup-
port the idea that an individual's position as a shareholder is only
determinative of financial interest, while his position as a direc-
tor or officer of a corporation is determinative of supervisory ca-
pacity.110 In RCA/Ariola International, Inc. v. Thomas & Gray-
ston Co.,"' a record company brought suit against retailers and
manufacturers who allowed customers to use a cassette tape re-
cording machine for copyright infringement.'12 The plaintiff also
sued the manufacturer's president, James McCann."' In finding
McCann vicariously liable, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit noted that as president, McCann instructed
the direct infringers on what uses of the copiers to permit and
that he had a direct financial interest in the manufacturer be-
cause he was a fifty percent shareholder." 4 Also, in Pinkham v.
Sara Lee Corp.,"' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found the president and sole shareholder of the di-
rect infringer vicariously liable for copyright infringement." 6 The
court noted that, as president, he approved the sale of the infring-
ing materials, and as sole shareholder, he had a financial interest
Minn. 2000) (holding membership on the board of directors of a corporation does not, by
itself, demonstrate the ability to supervise the infringing activity).
109. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ'g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D.
Fla. 1995) (holding an individual shareholder, who is also the president of the infringing
corporation, vicariously liable for the infringement); Major League Baseball Promotion
Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1035, 1043 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that it is appro-
priate to hold the president of the corporation, who controls 90% of the shares, both per-
sonally and vicariously liable for the corporation's infringing activity); Ford Motor Co. v.
B&H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975, 989-90 (D. Minn. 1986) (holding the president, who is
also the sole shareholder, personally liable for the activities of the corporation).
110. See Scott J. Spooner, Shareholder Liability under the U.S. Copyright Act, 21
INTELL. PROP. NEWSL. (ABA/Section on Intell. Prop. L., Chicago, Ill.) Spring 2003, at 3-5
(discussing different approaches to the liability of parent corporations as shareholders of
subsidiaries).
111. 845 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 776.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 782; see also Playboy Enters., 900 F. Supp. at 441; Major League Baseball
Promotion, 729 F. Supp. at 1043; B&H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. at 989-90; Boz Scaggs
Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 913-14 (D. Conn. 1980) (holding corporate officer
vicariously liable because he supervised infringing activity in his work for corporation and
had financial interest in infringer).
115. 983 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1992).
116. Id. at 834.
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in the sale of the infringing material.117 By examining a defen-
dant's position in corporate management to determine supervi-
sory ability, these decisions suggest that a defendant's status as
shareholder does not indicate the requisite "ability to control" in-
fringing activity. The holdings of Softel and Washington Mint
lend support to this view.
B. Parent-Subsidiary Entities
In the parent-subsidiary context, courts take a different ap-
proach to determining vicarious copyright liability by employing
one of three closely-related tests. Some courts use the traditional
Shapiro test. Other courts recognize that "the mere potential to
influence inherent in the parent-subsidiary relationship is inade-
quate to ground vicarious liability for infringement."118 These
courts employ either a modified Shapiro test, or a "substantial
and continuing connection" standard, to determine vicarious
copyright liability of parent corporations for the acts of their sub-
sidiaries.
1. Traditional Shapiro Analysis
In the few decisions that use the traditional Shapiro test, the
courts rarely undertake a separate analysis under the two prongs
of the test and do not explicitly state which facts are relevant to
each prong. For example, in Data General Corp. v. Grumman
Data Systems Corp.,119 the court applied the Shapiro test to find
Grumman Data liable for the infringing acts of its subsidiary,
GSSC. 2 ° In reaching this holding, the court simply stated that:
(1) GSSC was a wholly owned subsidiary of Grumman Data; (2)
two of GSSC's three directors were Grumman Data employees; (3)
the President of GSSC was employed by and received his compen-
sation from Grumman Data, not GSSC; (4) the President of GSSC
reported directly to Grumman Data's President, who was also a
GSSC director; (5) the entire first tier of GSSC's executives was
employed by Grumman Data, not GSSC, and was responsible for
conducting and supervising the everyday activities of GSSC; (6)
117. Id.
118. Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
119. 886 F. Supp. 927 (D. Mass. 1994).
120. See id. at 930.
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Grumman Data employees knew about and approved the alleged
infringing conduct of GSSC; and (7) Grumman Data, as the sole
owner of GSSC, benefited financially from GSSC's alleged infring-
ing activity. 121 By simply listing these factors, the court failed to
specify which were applicable to the first prong and which were
applicable to the second prong.
2. The "Substantial and Continuing Connection" Standard
The "substantial and continuing connection" standard was first
set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. In Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. ("Frank
Music /,),122 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that a subsidiary infringed the copyright in a dramatico-musical
play, but remanded for reconsideration of the issue of whether the
parent should also be liable. 2 ' The court held that "[a] parent
corporation cannot be held liable for the infringing actions of its
subsidiary unless there is a substantial and continuing connec-
tion between the two with respect to the infringing acts," and in-
structed the lower court to use this test in its determination.
124
On remand, the district court found the parent not liable, and the
plaintiff again appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 125 In Frank Music
11,126 the court once more reversed, finding the parent corporation
had a sufficiently "substantial and continuing connection" to its
subsidiary with respect to the infringing acts to be vicariously li-
able. 127
While the Frank Music test is somewhat vague as to what con-
stitutes a "substantial and continuing connection," the Frank Mu-
sic II decision, as well as other decisions in courts that have
adopted the test, are instructive. In finding the parent corpora-
tion vicariously liable in Frank Music II, the Ninth Circuit fo-
121. Id. at 930-31; see also Brode v. Tax Mgmt, Inc., No. 88C 10698, 1990 WL 25691
(N.D. Il. Feb. 1, 1990) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff
showed that there was an issue as to the company vice president's role in the company's
copyrights infringement).
122. 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. Id. at 519.
124. Id. at 519-20.
125. Frank Music Corp. v. MGM, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1547 (9th Cir. 1989).
126. 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 1553.
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cused on the fact that: (1) the subsidiary was wholly owned by the
parent; (2) the subsidiary used the parent's facilities for prepar-
ing the infringing performances; (3) the parent's legal counsel re-
sponded to the plaintiffs allegations of infringement; (4) the par-
ent hired the subsidiary employee who created the infringing
performances; (5) the subsidiary employee who created the in-
fringing performances maintained an office at the parent; (6) the
purpose of the infringing performances was to promote the par-
ent; and (7) the employee who created the infringing perform-
ances actively consulted with personnel from the parent. 121
Other courts have endorsed the Frank Music factors or incor-
porated them into the traditional vicarious liability test.'29 These
courts note that under the Frank Music test, "there must be indi-
cia beyond the mere legal relationship showing that the parent is
actually involved with the decisions, processes, or personnel di-
rectly responsible for the infringing activity." 130
3. A Hybrid Approach Under Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc.
In Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc.,'31 the court adopted a hybrid
test, incorporating the Frank Music standard into the traditional
Shapiro test. 13 2 The court began its discussion with an analysis of
Shapiro, which noted the doctrine of respondeat superior clearly
placed vicarious liability for an employee's infringement upon the
employer. 133 The court stated that "[iin the typical employer-
employee relationship, it is reasonable to presume that the em-
ployer is intimately linked with and responsible for an employee's
acts of infringement. Indeed, when acting within the scope of em-
ployment, an employee is presumed to be the employer's
agent." 134
128. Id.
129. For cases endorsing the "substantial and continuing connection" standard, see
Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1998). See also
Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying the
Frank Music test in the trademark context); Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103,
1108-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
130. Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1109.
131. 869 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
132. Id. at 1109-10.
133. See id. at 1107 (citing Shapiro, Beinstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,
307 (2d Cir. 1963)).
134. Id. at 1109.
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However, the Banff court analogized the parent-subsidiary re-
lationship as closer to a landlord-tenant relationship than an em-
ployer-employee relationship. 3 ' "[T]he Shapiro court cited with
approval a line of cases finding no vicarious liability for landlords
leasing property . . . to tenants engaged in infringing activi-
ties."'36 Although the Banff court recognized that an employer-
employee relationship carries with it a presumption that one
party's acts are attributable to the other, this is not so in a land-
lord-tenant relationship, and "[l]ike the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, the parent-subsidiary relationship is not marked by [this]
presumption."'37 Discussing the issue of the exercise of control a
parent may exert over its subsidiary, the Banff court focused on
the independent nature of subsidiary corporations, stating:
A subsidiary possesses an independent legal existence; it may organ-
ize its affairs and make its decisions completely independently of its
parent. Of course, it may also do the opposite and organize its affairs
and make its decisions according to the direction of its parent. That
parent's influence, however, is characteristic only of that particular
parent-subsidiary relationship, and is not inherent in the nature of
the relationship in either legal or practical terms. Given that the ac-
tual exercise of control cannot be presumed from the mere power to
control, it is logical to reauire evidence of actual control and supervi-
sion before holding the parent liable. 13
8
Thus, the Banff court rejected a presumption that a parent al-
ways, as a matter of law, controls its subsidiary.'39 It found such
a presumption unworkable. 4 ° As the court stated, "The case is
easiest when the parent wholly owns the subsidiary, but what of
a parent that owns 51% of its subsidiary? Or perhaps 40% of the
subsidiary, making it the largest shareholder? The need to de-
termine whether actual control is exercised is inevitable.' 4 1
The Banff court established that, in order
to prevail against a parent corporation on the theory of vicarious
copyright infringement, ... the plaintiff must show that the parent
has a direct financial interest in the infringing activity, and that the
135. See id.
136. Id. (citing Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1109-10.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1110 n.6.
141. Id.
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parent has the right and ability to supervise the subsidiary, which is
evidenced bv some continuing connection between the two in regard
to the infringing activity. 142
Following Banff, other courts have adopted this rule as well. 14 3
4. Per Se Liability
At least one court has held that, as a matter of law, a parent
corporation is always liable for the infringing acts of its subsidi-
ary. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp.,144 held that
the defendant, Hartmarx, a holding company, was vicariously li-
able for infringing public performances of copyrighted musical
compositions at two stores owned by the defendant's subsidiar-
ies. 145 The court stated:
We also find as a matter of law that Hartmarx has the right and
ability to supervise its subsidiaries-that is, to guard against or po-
lice the allegedly infringing activity. Our conclusion rests in part on
the legal relationship between Hartmarx and its subsidiaries. Be-
cause Hartmarx owns a controlling interest in the subsidiaries, it
elects the Board of Directors, who in turn select each subsidiary's of-
ficers. Control over the Board, then, in effect equals control over the
subsidiaries' officers. Since the officers run the day-to-day affairs of
the subsidiary, control of those officers in turn equals the right to
control even the day-to-day matters of the subsidiary. Though Hart-
marx makes much of the fact that it merely makes "recommenda-
tions" to the subsidiaries' CEOs and that the CEOs do not always
comply, it cannot be disputed that if a CEO refuses to "cooperate,"
Hartmarx can simply, through its power over the Board, have her
removed. Thus, it is clear to us that Hartmarx has the right to su-
pervise its subsidiaries' activities--down to a subsidiary's unlicensed
use of copyrighted music-through its power to remove recalcitrant
officers. It is the existence of the riaht to sunervise. not whether
Hartmarx in fact chose to exercise that right, that is at issue. 146
142. Id. at 1110.
143. See, e.g., Scandinavian Satellite Sys., AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 146 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18
(D.D.C. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 291 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Burdick v. Koerner,
988 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (requiring actual control of day-to-day operations
of corporation in order to establish right and ability to control to find director of corpora-
tion vicariously liable).
144. No. 88 C 2856, 1988 WL 128691 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1988).
145. Id. at *1, *4.
146. Id. at *3.
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However, in Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp.,147 this holding
was later criticized by a different judge sitting in the same dis-
trict court There, the court declined to adopt the holding that a
parent company's power to supervise and control the conduct of a
subsidiary may be inferred solely from the parent-subsidiary re-
lationship. 148 In fact, the court used the test set forth in Banff.'49
No case since Broadcast Music has taken such a strict view of vi-
carious copyright liability.
IV. INCORPORATING VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND CORPORATE LAW
PRINCIPLES WITH THE ACTUAL CONTROL STANDARD
A. Courts Should Use the Actual Control Standard When
Evaluating Parental Liability for the Acts of a Subsidiary
1. Incentives to Supervise
Any test for vicarious copyright liability must create incentives
for limited supervision in order to increase copyright protection
but maintain the separate nature of corporate ownership and
management. Requiring mere legal control would create greater
incentives for heavy supervision. If a parent could be found vi-
cariously liable based solely on ownership of the subsidiary, it
would be forced to monitor all the subsidiary's operations in order
to ensure no infringement occurs, thus shielding itself from liabil-
ity. This intense level of supervision would be in direct conflict
with corporate law principles that encourage a separation be-
tween shareholders and management, and the limited liability of
shareholders. In addition, if a parent or other majority share-
holder was too controlling of its subsidiary, the rights of the other
shareholders would be diminished."'5 As the court noted in Banff,
147. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
148. See id. at 1045 (citing Broad. Music, 1988 WL 128691, at *3); see also Seals v.
Compendia Media Group, 290 F. Supp. 2d 947, 953 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (explaining that
Goes Lithography declined to adopt the holding that a parent company's power to super-
vise and control infringing conduct of a subsidiary may be inferred solely from the parent-
subsidiary relationship, but did not reject the Hartmarx analysis of the direct financial
benefit prong).
149. See Goes Lithography, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1045 (citing Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc.,
869 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
150. In the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, the rights of minority shareholders
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"the formal relationship between parties is not the driving force
behind liability."151
Furthermore, the heavy supervision required by a legal control
rule would expose the parent to liability under other causes of ac-
tion. If copyright law insists on forcing a parent to dominate its
subsidiary and treat it merely as a division of the parent rather
than as a separate corporation, the veil would be pierced for all
purposes. Thus, the parent's assets would be exposed not only to
infringement claims, but to all the subsidiary's creditors. This il-
logical result reveals that traditional corporate law doctrines are
better suited for determining liability than copyright law.
In addition, courts recognize the considerable cost of requiring
parties to institute extraordinary measures to supervise may
outweigh the benefit of monitoring the direct infringer. 152 In Art-
ists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing (USA), Inc.,1" 3 the plaintiffs-
copyright owners sued Reed, a trade show organizer, when Reed
rented out booths at a trade show to direct infringers." 4 The
plaintiffs argued Reed could have policed the exhibitors to pre-
vent infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights in songs played at the
exhibitioners' booths.155 However, Reed pointed out that in order
to police the infringers, "[it] would have had to hire several inves-
tigators with the expertise to identify music, to determine
whether it was copyrighted, to determine whether the use was li-
censed, and finally to determine whether the use was a 'fair
use.""5 6 The court held that "[t]he mere fact that [Reed] could
have policed the exhibitors at great expense is insufficient to im-
pose vicarious liability."157
Likewise, in the corporate context, the cost, in terms of the ef-
fect on the corporate entity, of forcing a parent corporation to
overly monitor and become involved in the activities of its sub-
sidiary outweighs the benefit of enforcing infringement against
the parent. The financial burden that results from maintaining
would not be a relevant consideration.
151. Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1109.
152. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (E.D. Cal.
1994), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
153. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
154. See id. at 1624.
155. See id. at 1627.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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such a high level of supervision would greatly hinder the overall
economic success of a corporation. This effect is critical to con-
sider, particularly for the corporate world, because corporations
function almost exclusively on cost-benefit principles in every as-
pect of their operation. Thus, such a legal principle would bring
business to a grinding halt when costs begin to outweigh benefits.
However, requiring evidence of actual control would create in-
centives for limited supervision. First, a parent corporation which
does not supervise the acts of a subsidiary risks damaging its in-
vestment. If the subsidiary is found liable for infringement, it will
be forced to pay damages and submit to other remedies. In addi-
tion, the business reputation of both the subsidiary and parent
would be tarnished, thereby negatively affecting future business.
Furthermore, if a subsidiary does infringe a copyright, a potential
plaintiff would not necessarily be without a cause of action. As-
suming a plaintiff could in fact prove infringement, the subsidi-
ary, as the direct infringer, will always be liable. Then, if the as-
sets of the parent corporation need to be reached, the remedies
under the doctrines of piercing the corporate veil and direct liabil-
ity would be available. Finally, although vicarious liability tradi-
tionally seeks to encourage those who have the means to prevent
infringement to do so, corporate law doctrines seek to encourage
investment without excessive interference with corporate man-
agement. Because the ultimate aim in granting copyrights is to
"serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of litera-
ture, music, and the other arts,"' and limited shareholder liabil-
ity is an "attribute of the investment rather than of 'the corpora-
tion,"'159 the law should encourage investment and accept the risk
of some copyright losses, rather than discourage investment and
provide wide-ranging enforcement of copyright violations.
An actual control standard would also encourage limited pa-
rental supervision without exposing the parent to liability. Ab-
sent a "substantial and continuing connection" related to the in-
fringing activity, a parent could take steps to ensure a subsidiary
is not engaged in copyright infringement. This would encourage
limited supervision without the parent incurring liability, and a
lack of complete interference with the subsidiary's operations
158. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
159. EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 11.
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would shield the parent from liability under corporate law doc-
trines. 1
60
2. Factors Showing a "Substantial and Continuing Connection"
Between the Parent and Subsidiary With Respect to the
Infringing Acts
When evaluating a parent corporation's degree of supervision
and control over a subsidiary, courts should look for a "substan-
tial and continuing connection" between them with respect to the
infringing acts, similar to the analysis in Banif161 and Frank Mu-
sic 11.162 However, several factors are imperative to this determi-
nation that courts do not currently consider.
First, courts should look for evidence establishing the extent of
parental participation in the infringement. This includes whether
the subsidiary's employees consulted with the parent's employees
in committing the infringement, and whether the subsidiary used
the parent's resources (e.g., facilities or distribution channels) in
furtherance of the activity. If a parent's resources were used to
assist the infringement, then the parent had an opportunity to
prevent the infringement by withholding its resources from the
subsidiary. Evidence that the parent's resources were used in fur-
therance of the infringing activity shows the parent has control
over the activity, even if the parent was unaware of its infringing
nature. 163
Second, courts should determine the purpose of the infringing
activity. If the goal of the infringement was to directly benefit the
parent, for example by promoting its trademark or its products,
this would demonstrate the parent had both a direct interest in
the activity and control over it. In contrast, if the purpose was to
benefit only the subsidiary, parental interest and control would
160. For a discussion of the application of these policies in the case of wholly owned
subsidiaries, see supra text at note 150.
161. See supra. Part III.B.3.
162. See supra Part III.B.2.
163. Under this factor, a parent's knowledge of the infringement is not a consideration.
However, if the parent has knowledge of the infringing activity and allows its resources to
be used in furtherance of the activity, it may be held liable under the doctrine of contribu-
tory infringement. As the Second Circuit stated, "One who, with knowledge of the infring-
ing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,
may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." Gershwin Publ'n Corp. v. Columbia Art-
ists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
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necessarily be excluded. While one could argue any benefit to the
subsidiary is also an indirect benefit to the parent by virtue of the
parent's ownership of the subsidiary, this factor must look only to
direct benefit. Indirect benefits to the parent, predicated solely on
the legal relationship between the parent and subsidiary, do not
indicate parental supervision, control, or involvement.
Finally, courts should evaluate whether the parent explicitly or
implicitly endorsed the activity that resulted in infringement.
This includes whether the parent proposed or initiated the in-
fringing activity by directing the subsidiary to take such action,
or whether it was solely the subsidiary's plan to commit the in-
fringing act. This factor ensures that a parent will be liable if it
formed the subsidiary for the sole purpose of engaging in the in-
fringing activity, or if the parent directed an already existing
subsidiary to undertake the infringing activity in order to shield
itself from liability. Courts should also evaluate whether the par-
ent endorsed the activity, or whether the parent disapproved or
explicitly instructed the subsidiary not to undertake it. Parental
direction and endorsement would establish substantial connec-
tion and control in the infringing activity. Conversely, parental
disapproval or explicit instructions not to engage in the infringing
activity would tend to establish little or no control. Whether
counsel for the parent or counsel for the subsidiary responded to
the plaintiffs allegations of infringement would also be relevant.
Because the law should encourage limited supervision and dis-
suade claims of ignorance, under this factor, a complete lack of
knowledge by the parent would neither help nor hurt its position.
A parent seeking to avoid liability could not argue it simply did
not approve the infringing activity; it must show it tried to pre-
vent it. Evaluation of these elements of control ensures that a
parent's "right to police" the subsidiary could in fact be exercised
if the parent/shareholder chose to do so.""
164. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001)
("To escape imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved right to police must be exercised
to its fullest extent. Turning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of
profit gives rise to liability."); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("There is also no dispute for purposes of this appeal that Cherry Auction and
its operators were aware that vendors in their swap meet were selling counterfeit re-
cordings."); see also Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963), for the proposition that failure to police the con-
duct of the primary infringer leads to imposition of vicarious liability for copyright in-
fringement).
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As discussed above and reiterated by a substantial number of
courts, a lack of knowledge is no defense to traditional vicarious
copyright infringement. 165 However, in the parent-subsidiary con-
text, knowledge of the infringement should be a relevant consid-
eration. While in an employer-employee relationship there is a
presumption that the parties are "intimately linked," and one
party's acts are attributable to the other party, this is not so in
the landlord-tenant relationship.166 In the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship, lack of knowledge of the infringement is a factor in de-
termining liability.167 The decision in Banff explicitly noted that
parent-subsidiary relationships are more analogous to landlord-
tenant relationships than employer-employee relationships be-
cause in a parent-subsidiary relationship, "[a] subsidiary pos-
sesses an independent legal existence; it may organize its affairs
and make its decisions completely independently of its parent." 16
Furthermore, while courts have found vicarious liability even
when the defendant has no knowledge of the infringement or
gives explicit instructions not to infringe, they have done so only
when the parties are closely associated with each other. 169
3. The Percentage of Stock Ownership Should Only be
Determinative of the Financial Interest Prong
Notably absent from this analysis is the percentage of the par-
ent's share ownership of its subsidiary.
165. See supra Part II.B.2.
166. See Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
167. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 (explaining that a landlord is not vicariously liable
for a tenant's infringement where he does not have knowledge of the violation); see also
Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (noting that more than just a landlord-
tenant relationship must exist to impose vicarious liability); cf. Fromat v. Aeolian Co., 254
F. 592, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (holding that an innocent landlord cannot be liable for copy-
right infringement).
168. Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1109.
169. See, e.g., Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Systems, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1190 (D.
Del. 1974) (holding a defendant furnishing materials to a printer is liable if printer
chooses to reproduce infringing matter from the materials even if defendant had in-
structed the printer not to do so); Bourne v. Fauche, 238 F. Supp. 745, 746-47 (E.D.S.C.
1965) (holding night club owners liable for performance of infringing songs, even though
they had no knowledge or intent to infringe). Note that in Chappel & Co. v. Frankel, 285
F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and in Morser v. Bengor Prods. Co., 283 F. Supp.
926, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), corporate officers were held liable as related defendants, al-
though in Chappel, the defendant was unaware that the activities he directed were in-
fringing, and in Morser, the infringing sales were made contrary to the defendant's in-
structions. However, in both of these cases, the defendants, by their acts, also caused the
infringement. See Chappel & Co., 285 F. Supp. at 801; Marser, 283 F. Supp. at 928.
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Contrary to many courts' evaluations of parent-subsidiary vi-
carious copyright liability, including the "substantial and continu-
ing connection" standard as applied in Frank Music, the percent-
age of share ownership is irrelevant to a determination of actual
control. Under the test proposed here, it has no part in the analy-
sis. As is the case with individual controlling shareholders, courts
should not infer that a parent corporation has control of a sub-
sidiary merely because of its percentage of stock ownership.
The term "parent corporation" refers to a corporation that has
effective control through majority or complete stock ownership of
one or more subsidiary corporations. 170 Courts generally treat a
person or entity as having such power, and therefore as a control-
ling shareholder, in two situations: (1) when the person or entity
owns a majority of the corporation's outstanding voting stock, and
(2) when the person or entity does not own a majority interest but
nevertheless exercises effective control over the corporation's
business. 17' Even assuming a parent corporation has full owner-
ship of a subsidiary, or at least a number of shares sufficient to
appoint the subsidiary's board of directors, this fact alone is insuf-
ficient to infer actual control over the decisions of the subsidiary.
A controlling shareholder normally has the power to elect and
remove the corporation's board of directors, who will, it is as-
sumed, show allegiance to the interests of the shareholder who
elected them. 7 2 The board of directors, in turn, appoints officers
170. See Schnoor v. Deitchler, 482 N.w.2d 913, 915 (Iowa 1992); Culcal Stylco, Inc. v.
Vornado, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
171. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1987); Locati v. Johnson, 980 P.2d 173, 176 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). If a shareholder holds less
than a majority of the corporation's voting stock, the shareholder might still have effective
control over the corporation. For example, the shareholder could have the effective ability
to determine who serves on the board because the shareholder owns a significant portion
of the corporation's stock and the remaining ownership of the corporation is widely dis-
persed. See, e.g., Gottesman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (holding that DuPont had the power to control General Motors despite the fact that
DuPont only held 23% of the stock in the corporation), remanded on other grounds, 414
F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969).
172. See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating
that "a majority shareholder can control the corporation for its own benefit ... through the
election of directors who favor its interests"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 502
U.S. 801 (1991). However, some commentators have argued that in the case of wholly
owned or nearly wholly owned subsidiaries, the "practical reality" is that the subsidiary is
not very independent. Mendelson, supra note 14, at 1213-14. However, "a presumption
that a parent can control its subsidiary would be unworkable .... The need to determine
whether actual control is exercised is inevitable." Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp.
1103, 1110 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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of the corporation. However, in each step the shareholder is fur-
ther removed from the decision that ultimately results in copy-
right infringement. The directors and officers each have a fiduci-
ary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation that is their
employer. 7 3 Thus, the directors and officers of a subsidiary are
presumed to be acting in the best interests of the subsidiary, or
the shareholders as a whole. Even in the case of staggered
boards, where the parent and subsidiary have common directors,
courts presume "that the directors are wearing their 'subsidiary
hats' and not their 'parent hats' when acting for the subsidi-
ary."1 7 4
Furthermore, percent of stock ownership is misleading because
it does not take into consideration the rights and powers of mi-
nority shareholders. Control over a board of directors does not
depend merely on a percentage of shares, but rather depends on
the percentage of shares owned when viewed in the context of the
voting arrangements between the shareholders. For example, su-
permajority provisions and tenured shares can limit the ability of
majority shareholders to "control" a corporation by requiring the
consent or vote of minority shareholders. Also, often the only con-
trol minority shareholders can exercise is negative control indi-
rectly related to any infringing acts.'75 Investment companies and
minority shareholders should not be required to "go to war to
avoid vicarious liability, whenever a company in which it invests
173. In accepting the office, directors and officers impliedly undertake to give to the
enterprise the benefit of their care and best judgment and to exercise the powers conferred
solely in the interest of the corporation or the stockholders as a body or corporate entity
and not for their own personal interests. See Glass v. Glass, 321 S.E.2d 69, 74 (Va. 1984);
C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Leavell Co., 676 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App. 1984); Wisconsin Ave. As-
socs., Inc. v. 2720 Wisconsin Ave. Coop. Ass'n, Inc., 441 A.2d 956, 962-63 (D.C. 1982).
174. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN
THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1.02.1, at 12 (1992). But see Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) ("[A] parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common,
not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two sepa-
rate corporate consciousnesses, but one.").
175. "Negative control includes, but is not limited to, instances where a minority
shareholder has the ability under the concern's charter, by-laws, or shareholder's agree-
ment, to prevent a quorum or otherwise block action by the board of director's or share-
holders." 13 C.F.R. § 121.03 (2006). There are various restrictions that companies enact
during the planning stages of a corporation to secure minority shareholders' rights. See
generally F. Hodge O'Neal, Minimizing Recurring Problems Through Prudent Planning
Techniques, in MINORITY STOCKHOLDER RIGHTS: CORPORATE PLANNING AND LITIGATION
STRATEGY 11-28 (1978).
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plans to do something that might ultimately turn out to be a
copyright infringement."
176
B. Corporate Law Doctrines Allow Liability Where There is
Overwhelming Control
In practice, the degree of control that a parent actually exer-
cises over a subsidiary varies. At one end of the spectrum, a par-
ent may dictate major policy decisions but allow the subsidiary to
act independently regarding its daily operations. 17  In such a
case, the percentage of share ownership does not resolve the "con-
trol" issue of vicarious copyright liability, and the analysis out-
lined above can be used to resolve liability. At the other end, a
parent may dominate the subsidiary entirely and treat it merely
as a division of the parent rather than as a separate corporation.
In this instance, the corporate law doctrines of piercing the corpo-
rate veil and direct liability come into play, and are better suited
to resolving liability in such a situation than copyright law.
CONCLUSION
The current tests courts employ to determine vicarious copy-
right infringement in parent-subsidiary relationships are ineffec-
tive, unreliable, and unsettled. The traditional Shapiro test does
not differentiate "actual control" from "legal control," and in many
cases, a parent corporation could be found liable under both
176. Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 9944, 2005 WL 14920, at
*26 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005). The test set forth in Part IV.A.2 would still be relevant even
in the case of wholly owned subsidiaries. The argument that a parent corporation should
face liability under traditional vicarious liability when its wholly owned subsidiary com-
mits copyright infringement is appealing. However, several considerations weigh against
this argument. First, the percentage of shares owned, even if one hundred percent, still
does not determine "control." A parent may still allow a wholly owned subsidiary to inde-
pendently conduct its daily operations and dictate only major policy. Also, the directors
and officers of the subsidiary may be disregarding parental directives, even in the face of
explicit instructions not to engage in the infringement. Second, the directors and officers of
the subsidiary would still have a fiduciary duty to the subsidiary, and would be presumed
to act in its best interests. Finally, if traditional vicarious copyright liability applied in the
case of wholly owned subsidiaries, but the test set forth in Part IV.A.2 applied in the case
of non-wholly owned subsidiaries, the parent could escape the traditional test for liability
by merely selling nominal shares to a third party. If the parent was no longer the sole
owner of the subsidiary, a fact-based determination of control would be inevitable, and the
test set forth in Part IV would apply.
177. See, e.g., Goss Graphic Sys., Inc. v. MAN Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesell-
schaft, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1067-68 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
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prongs of the test by virtue of its mere legal relationship to its
subsidiary. The "substantial and continuing connection" standard
under Frank Music is more effective, but it is imprecise and im-
properly considers the parent's percentage of stock ownership.
Finally, the Banff test is the most useful, but it does not consider
various factors that should be determinative of liability, and does
not recognize knowledge of the parent corporation as a factor in
determining liability.
A more effective test looks to factors evidencing actual control,
including the extent of parental participation in the infringement,
the purpose of the infringing activity, and whether the parent ex-
plicitly or implicitly approved or endorsed the activity that re-
sulted in infringement. This test would dissuade both overbearing
corporate control and willful ignorance, and create incentives for
the limited supervision of subsidiary corporations to prevent
copyright infringement, thus satisfying both the needs of copy-
right enforcement and corporate law doctrines. When parental
supervision is too heavy, the corporate doctrines of piercing the
corporate veil and direct liability serve to hold the parties in-
volved responsible. When parental supervision is too light, a par-
ent risks damaging its investment by allowing copyright in-
fringement, and copyrights will still be enforced to the extent that
the formal relationship between the parent and subsidiary is not
the driving force behind the liability.
Even if this standard somewhat favors shareholder protection,
the law must ensure that it encourages investment without ex-
cessively holding related defendants liable. Such a doctrinal
framework guarantees the realization of the ultimate aim of
copyright, which is not to reward authors, but rather to "serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts."178
Joshua M. Siegel
178. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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